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UTURE deep space exploration missions will require an Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) to supply oxygen 
for crew metabolic consumption. A deep space mission is envisioned to have a crew of 4 and a duration of 1,100 
days.  The system design will be based on the International Space Station (ISS) OGA but with added improvements 
based on lessons learned during ISS operations and technological advances made since the original OGA was designed 
and built. These improvements will reduce system weight, crew maintenance time and spares mass while increasing 
reliability. Currently, the design team is investigating the feasibility of the upgrades by performing ground tests and 
analyses.  Significant future work is planned.  The ISS OGA will be modified to an Exploration based Advanced OGA 
(AOGA) configuration. The current status of the redesign effort will be presented in this paper. 
II. ISS OGA Description and Current Status 
As of April 21, 2019, the ISS OGA has produced over 16,184 lbm of oxygen and 2,023 lbm of hydrogen.  The 
currently installed OGA electrolysis cell stack has accumulated a total operating time of 21,198 hours.  See Figure 1 
for a plot of oxygen produced over time. 
A simplified schematic of the OGA is shown 
in Figure 3.  The OGA consists of the following 
Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs): Water, 
Inlet Deionizing Bed, Hydrogen, Recirculation 
Pump, Nitrogen Purge, Oxygen Outlet, 
Hydrogen Sensor, Power Supply Module 
(PSM), and Process Controller.  Feed water 
from the ISS potable water bus enters the OGA 
through the Water ORU and flows through an 
Inlet Deionizing Bed, which serves as an iodine 
remover and as a coalescer for any oxygen gas 
bubbles that may be present in the feedwater.  If 
gas bubbles are detected by the gas sensor 
downstream of the DI bed, the feedwater is 
rejected by a three-way valve to the waste water 
bus. This prevents any oxygen that may be 
present in the feedwater from mixing with the 
generated hydrogen in the Rotary Separator 
Accumulator (RSA). Water is electrolyzed by 
the cell stack to produce oxygen and hydrogen.  The RSA separates the cathode side product gaseous hydrogen from 
the water. The Hydrogen ORU consists of a dome which surrounds the components which contain hydrogen (cell 
stack, RSA, sensors, valves, etc.). The hydrogen dome provides a multiple leakage barrier protection in the event of a 
failure.  The hydrogen dome is maintained at low pressure by venting to space vacuum.  The water is recirculated by 
the positive displacement Pump ORU.  Downstream of the pump is an Activated Carbon Ion Exchange (ACTEX) 
filter.  The ACTEX is a mixed bed deionizer, which removes fluoride generated from the cell stack and other 
contaminants.  The heat exchanger removes heat generated by the cell stack, RSA and pump.  The separated hydrogen 
gas from the RSA is sent either to the Sabatier Carbon Dioxide Reduction Assembly or optionally out to space through 
the vacuum vent.  Oxygen produced by the cell stack passes through the Oxygen Outlet ORU containing a water 
absorber, which protects the downstream hydrogen sensors from liquid water.  The Hydrogen Sensor ORU monitors 
the product oxygen for the presence of hydrogen, which would indicate leakage within the cell stack and signal the 
OGA Process Controller to quickly shut down the OGA. The Nitrogen Purge ORU stores a pressurized volume of 
nitrogen gas from the ISS distribution line to purge the OGA cell stack upon shutdown and startup.  Nitrogen is utilized 
to mitigate the safety hazards associated with the mixing of oxygen and hydrogen within the cell stack or the dome. 
The nitrogen can also be used to inert the dome environment during extended periods of non-operation.  The Process 
Controller ORU is responsible for OGA system command/control and communication with the ISS.  The OGA sensors 
are used for fault detection and fault isolation purposes. In addition, sensor data can be used to indicate that an ORU 
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Figure 1. Total Oxygen Produced by the ISS OGA 
 
 




should be scheduled for change-out with a pre-positioned, on-orbit spare ORU.  The Power Supply Module (PSM) 
ORU provides power to the OGA electrolysis cell stack.  The PSM ORU 
provides a variable range of 10-46.9 amps of current to the OGA cell stack 
during Process mode and 1.0 amps (A) during Standby mode (2% oxygen 
production rate). 
 The ISS OGA was originally designed to generate oxygen at a nominal rate 
of 12 lbm/day when operated on day/night orbital cycles (53 minutes at 100% 
production, 37 minutes in standby which produces 0.44 lbm/day of oxygen), 
and also at a selectable rate between 5.1 and 20.4 lbm/day or 22 to 100% oxygen 
production rate when operated continuously. At the nominal rate, the ISS OGA 
can support oxygen needs for 4 crew, while at the maximum rate it can support 
10.88 crew (assumes 1.874 lbm oxygen/day/crew metabolic rate).  The OGA 
has been and will continue to be operated continuously, as the electrical power 
constraints originally defined are no longer of concern.  The product oxygen 
meets quality specifications for temperature, free water, dew point, and 
hydrogen content.  The ISS OGA is packaged into nine ORUs, residing in the 
OGS rack, as shown in Figure 2.  Most of the OGA ORUs are run to failure 
except for the calibration life limited Hydrogen Sensor ORU and the mixed-
resin containing ORUs (Inlet DI Bed and recirculation loop ACTEX) which are 
trended for water throughput and recirculation loop water quality to determine 
the Preventative Maintenance (PM) replacement intervals. 
Major ISS OGA events from January 2016 through March 2019 are 
timelined in Figure 4.  Other than OGA component preventative maintenance 
replacements, periodic dome sensor vacuum zero point offsets, drifting hydrogen sensor inhibits and recirculation 
loop sample returns, there were previously three failures associated with the Hydrogen ORU and a recirculation loop 
pump anomaly, as documented in Reference 1.  The current Hydrogen ORU s/n 3 has been installed since November 
2016.  The cell voltages during steady state operation are nominal.  However, cell 1 voltage after shutdown is of 
possible concern, as it is the fastest cell to discharge, as shown in Figure 5 (Cell 1 is the blue line).  Also, during 
startup, it is the slowest to charge.  This behavior is similar to the previous Hydrogen ORU s/n 2 cell 1 prior to its 
failure.  At this time, the OGA team will continue to closely monitor Hydrogen ORU s/n 3 cell 1 voltage trend. 
 
























Figure 5. Hydrogen ORU s/n 3 Cell Voltages Upon Shutdown 
 
 
Figure 4. Timeline of Recent OGA Events (1/2016 to 3/2019) 
 
 





Pump ORU s/n 1 has a cumulative operating time of 8.4 years (well beyond its 2 year design life). Over the past 
year the pump has exhibited a gradual increase in speed from 2000 to 2040 rpm and decrease in motor temperature 
from 90 to 80 ̊F, as shown in Figure 6 (the blue line is the pump speed, the red line is temperature).  The recirculation 
loop is under software flow control, based on the venturi dP/flow sensors, which maintains constant loop water flow 
by adjusting the positive displacement pump speed.  The pump contains an integral bypass relief valve, which will 
crack open at approximately 30 psid.  A fault tree of potential root causes has been developed.  Potential causes 
include: pump gear wear leading to a less efficient pump, the pump bypass relief valve cracking open caused by 
recirculation loop delta pressure (dP) increase, and sensor/controller drift.  Unfortunately, the pump dP sensor failed 
in 2010, so there is no direct insight into recirculation loop dP.  Future troubleshooting will command a lower 
recirculation loop flow rate set point to create a lower recirculation loop dP to attempt to reseat the relief valve.  The 



















Analysis of the recirculation water is a critical part of monitoring cell stack and loop health. The WPA has exhibited 
multiple, increasing TOC (Total Organic Carbon) trends of potable water which is fed to the OGA recirculation loop.  
The source of previous TOC trends has been two organosilicons: Dimethylsilanediol (DMSD) and 
monomethylsilanetriol (MMST).  There is an unknown risk that DMSD could potentially affect cell stack performance 
by coating the inner surfaces of the cell stack and preventing water transport within the membrane.  Recirculation loop 
samples (~120 mL) are taken and returned for ground chemical and microbial analyses twice a year to monitor the 
health of the closed loop which concentrates contaminants.  Two loop water samples taken on 4/17/2018 and 
9/24/2018 were returned and analyzed.  The sample drawn on 3/4/2019 remains on-orbit awaiting return on SpX-17. 
pH and conductivity have been within acceptable ranges, with the pH averaging 5.5 and conductivity averaging 1.9 
uS/cm.  Over the past two years there have been increasing concentrations of TOC (9 to 21 ppm), DMSD (<1 to 3.8 
ppm), MMST (<1 to 4 ppm) and total silicon (0.06 to 4 ppm – includes DMSD and MMST) since a partial flush in 
November 2016.  Sample microbial enumerations ranged from 6.15E+03 to 3.45 E+05 CFU/mL with predominant 
microbial species identified as Ralston Pickettii, which has the ability to survive and thrive in low nutrient 
(oligotrophic) conditions.  It is theorized that in ultrapure water systems, the bacteria may be able to scavenge from 
the polymers in plastic piping. Studies have shown that R. pickettii may pass through a 0.2-mm filter.  Other techniques 
for monitoring the cell stack health include polarization scans (5 amp step-ups to plot current density versus voltage 
for each cell) and weekly trending of cell voltages.  Quarterly polarization scans have been all in family to date. 
 
III. Proposed Upgrades 
Based on the lessons learned during ISS operations and the 2017 supportability study recommendations (Reference 




Figure 6. Pump Speed Increase and Temperature Decrease 
 
 




Table 1. Proposed Upgrades 
Proposed Upgrade Reason Description 
Redesign the cell stack Implement corrective action based 
on the cell stack failure 
investigation 
Provide better support for the cell 
membranes, replace obsolete 
membrane material 
Delete the nitrogen purge equipment Reduce system mass and complexity Delete nitrogen purging of the cell 
stack anode during shutdowns and 
startups 
Replace the hydrogen sensors Reduce crew maintenance time and 
improve reliability 
Replace hydrogen sensors with a 
more reliable technology that 
requires less crew intervention 
Delete the wastewater interface Reduce system mass and complexity Allow oxygen gas that may be in the 
feedwater into the RSA rather than 
being rejected to the wastewater bus 
Remove the hydrogen dome Reduce logistics resupply 
requirements 
Crew will be able to access and 
maintain the internal dome 
components 
Redesign the PSM Reduce system mass/volume The current PSM design is oversized 
for a future mission and contains 
obsolete parts 
Redesign the recirculation loop 
ACTEX 
Increase installed life and reduce the 
delta pressure 
The existing design is not optimal as 
it was not specifically designed for 
the OGA application 
Redesign the process controller Provide ability to interface with new 
sensors and effectors being added to 
the AOGA design 
New connectors and backplane 
harnesses and swap-out of two 
sensor circuit card boards 
 
A. Cell Stack Redesign 
Cell stack s/n 5 (in Hydrogen ORU s/n 2) was removed from the ISS OGA in November 2016.  It was assembled 
in 2007 and installed 
in the ISS OGA in 
2010, accumulating 
approximately 5 
years of run time 
when removed.  The 
OGA team 
recommended 
removal due to cell 1 
voltage trending 
lower during 
Standby from the 
nominal 1.5 V 
towards the 
shutdown limit of 1.0 
V.  On Oct 21, 2016, 
cell 1 voltage (green 
line) decreased to 
1.17 V in Standby for 
7 hours, as shown in 
Figure 7, while the 
other 27 cells remained above 1.5 V.  In addition, cell 1 was the slowest to charge during activation and the fastest to 
discharge during deactivation.  
 
Figure 7. Cell Stack s/n 5, Cell Voltages 
 
 




When cell stack s/n 5 was returned to the ground, a test, teardown and evaluation (TT&E) was performed and cells 
1 and 2 were removed for analysis.  The TT&E started in 2017 and completed in 2018.  The membrane of cell 1 was 
found to be have thinned to 20 µm or approximately 90% loss of material in some areas, as shown in Figure 8.  In 
comparison the membrane of cell 2 had thinned about 50%.  The cause of the excessive thinning in cell 1 is believed 
to be a unique compressive loading in comparison to the other cells in the stack.  The loading in cell 1 increased the 
steady state creep of the membrane compared to its peers leading to excessive thinning at load points at the membrane 
interface.  Another factor that contributed to the increased creep is the support material for the membrane on the 
cathode uses a smaller landing than the anode backing material and may have been a contributor to the failure.  
Additionally, chemical degradation of the membrane from radicals generated during operation can contribute to 
overall or localized membrane thinning.  The membranes used at the time of assembly were more susceptible to 
chemical degradation and the material has been replaced with a chemically stabilized Nafion by the manufacturer 
Chemours.  The thinning of the membrane in cell 1 resulted in progressively less resistive shunt paths and the low cell 
voltage failure.  Cell membrane material creep characterization testing at multiple temperatures and compressive 
loading combinations over time (both with and without electrolysis) is in-work and expected to be completed by the 
end of 2019.  Early phase of creep rate 
testing results determined that the Time-
Temperature-Superposition (TTS) 
principle was effective in predicting long-
term creep behavior. Stress/load tends to 
dominate temperature effects. There is 
forward work to determine the 
contribution of electrolysis on membrane 
thinning due to mass loss within local high stress areas at the interfaces of membrane to cathode / anode supports.  
Redesign of the cell stack will focus on alleviating the unique loading of cell 1 by balancing the load profile across 
the stack, improving support of the MEA by increasing the number of landings on the anode and cathode membrane 
supports, minimizing creep through reduction of volume available for the membrane to move into, and reducing 
chemical degradation through incorporation of chemically stabilized Nafion. 
 
B. Delete the Nitrogen Purge Equipment 
The ISS OGA requires an external source of nitrogen, provided by the ISS vehicle.  The ISS OGA has 
approximately 50 lb of equipment to handle the storage and distribution of nitrogen.  Nitrogen is used for two purposes.  
The first is to purge the cell stack anode compartments upon system shutdown and startup.  During prolonged 
shutdowns, hydrogen in the cathode compartment will permeate through the membrane to the anode compartment, 
which contains oxygen.  At shutdown, a nitrogen purge will replace the oxygen with nitrogen, preventing a mixture 
of hydrogen and oxygen in the anode from forming over time when the system is unpowered.  At startup, a nitrogen 
purge removes any hydrogen that may have permeated through the membrane to the anode. 
The second purpose is to fill the hydrogen dome prior to removal from the system with nitrogen to create an inert 
condition for transportation.  If the hydrogen dome is deleted, as discussed elsewhere in this paper, the need for inerting 
the dome will be obviated. 
The benefit of deleting the nitrogen purging equipment is a reduction in system complexity and weight.  In 
addition, the vehicle design will be simplified since it will not be required to supply nitrogen to OGA.  The 2017 
supportability analysis (Reference 1) determined that nitrogen purge equipment accounted for 204 lb (93 kg) of spares 
upmass on a 1,100-day mission. Removal of the nitrogen purge equipment could lower total spares mass by this 
amount as well as reduce the OGA system mass. 
However, there are four safety concerns with eliminating the nitrogen purge equipment that will need to be 
addressed.  These concerns would occur during a shutdown and subsequent startup.  First, hydrogen could cross over 
the cell membranes from the cathode to the anode and create an unsafe hydrogen/oxygen mixture.  Second, oxygen 
could cross over the cell membranes from the anode to the cathode and create an unsafe hydrogen/oxygen mixture.  
Third, water could cross over the cell membranes from the cathode to the anode and flood the oxygen outlet line.  
Fourth, the recirculation loop pressure could drop below ambient and allow air to leak in, creating an unsafe 
hydrogen/air mixture.  Nitrogen purging pressurizes the cell stack anode and in turn the cell stack cathode and 
recirculation loop when the OGA is shutdown. 
When nitrogen purging is disabled, ground testing to date has not indicated any detectable hydrogen in the product 
oxygen, based on the hydrogen sensor readings during startup and gas chromatograph (GC) sampling of the product 
 
Figure 8.  Cell 1 Membrane Cross Section 
 
 




oxygen.  In addition, the testing to date has not indicated any oxygen in the product hydrogen, based on GC sampling 
of the product hydrogen. 
The major operational concerns with disabling nitrogen purging are: water in the oxygen outlet, low RSA quantity 
on subsequent startup, and low recirc loop pressure on subsequent startup. When nitrogen purging is disabled in the 
OGA testbed, a large amount of water (up to 330 mL) is observed in the oxygen outlet line upon every subsequent 
startup.  This amount of water at every startup is undesirable, since it would damage the hydrogen sensors in the 
oxygen outlet line.  In addition, liquid water is not allowed to exit the oxygen outlet port into the cabin.  This additional 
water would have to be captured by the oxygen outlet line water absorber, and a method for drying the absorber would 
need to be developed.  Without nitrogen purging, the cathode pressure is higher than the anode pressure.  The pressure 
gradient pushes water across the membrane from the cathode to the anode.  The second related issue is the low RSA 
quantity upon subsequent startup when nitrogen purging is disabled.  Testing has shown that a significant reduction 
of RSA water quantity occurs when nitrogen purging is disabled, from a nominal 25 – 30 cu-in to as low as 0 cu-in.  
This reduction in RSA water quantity during shutdown with nitrogen purging disabled can make the subsequent startup 
more difficult.  There is an Independent Shutdown Monitor (ISM) interlock which prevents the system from starting 
up if the RSA quantity is too low.  The related third issue is the low recirculation loop pressure on subsequent startup 
when nitrogen purging is disabled.  When nitrogen purging is enabled, the cell stack anode compartments are 
pressurized with nitrogen upon shutdown.  The nitrogen in the anode compartments permeates across the cell stack 
membranes to the cathode compartments and helps keep the recirculation loop pressure at a desirable level for the 
next startup.  When nitrogen purging is disabled during shutdown of the OGA testbed, the anode pressure is at ambient 
pressure, and the recirculation loop pressure drops close to ambient pressure within two days after the system is 
unpowered, as shown in Figure 9.  When the system is in Process, the recirculation loop pressure (blue line) is at about 
26 psia.  Once the system is unpowered, the recirculation loop pressure decreases to approximately 15.5 psia within 3 
days.  This pressure decrease makes the subsequent startup more difficult, as this is below the low shutdown limit for 
the recirculation loop pressure of 20.5 psia during Standby.  Given these operational issues, the design team will need 
to decide whether these issues can be managed if nitrogen purging were to be deleted. 
C. Replace Hydrogen Sensors 
The ISS OGA Hydrogen Sensor ORU contains three independent semiconductor dies (custom manufactured by a 
university) to monitor for hydrogen in the product oxygen prior to being released into the ISS cabin atmosphere.  The 
process controller shuts down the OGA if any of the sensors detect more than one percent hydrogen in oxygen (25% 
of the lower flammability limit, [LFL]).  The presence of hydrogen in the product oxygen indicates a possible cross 
 
Figure 9.  Recirculation Loop Pressure and Cell Stack Anode Pressure During Shutdown, No N2 Purge 
 
 




cell leak within the cell stack.  There are four issues with the hydrogen sensors which need to be addressed for an 
Exploration mission, as documented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Issues with the ISS OGA Hydrogen Sensors 
Issue Description 
Susceptible to damage from moisture If the sensor is powered with moisture on the die, 
damage will occur.  The crew is required to perform a 
dry oxygen purge, using specialized tools, after every 
shutdown. 
Significant upward drift on some sensors dies during on-
orbit operation 
Some of the sensor dies experience significant upward 
drift, above the shutdown limit.  Requires ground 
operators to disable the offending sensor to prevent a 
nuisance shutdown.  The root cause is unknown and this 
issue has not been experienced during ground test. 
Sensitivity to nitrogen Exposure to nitrogen (during a shutdown or startup 
nitrogen purge) can cause the sensors to go off-scale 
high.  Ground operators are required to disable the 
sensors and operate the system in standby to clear the 
fault. 
Requires return to the ground every 201 days for 
recalibration 
Installed life is limited by a known downward drift of 2 
Pascals per day (worst case). The sensors cannot be 
recalibrated on-orbit. 
 
Based on the past experience with the ISS OGA hydrogen sensors, AOGA hydrogen sensors requirements are 
defined in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Replacement Hydrogen Sensor Requirements 
Requirement Comments 
Capable of measuring hydrogen in oxygen Almost all commercially available hydrogen sensors are 
marketed as hydrogen in air sensors 
Minimal offset due to high relative humidity oxygen The current ISS OGA hydrogen sensors are susceptible 
to damage if powered after being exposed to high 
humidity gas. 
Minimal offset due to nitrogen exposure The current ISS OGA hydrogen sensors exhibit 
significant (temporary) offset after exposure to nitrogen.  
Nitrogen purging occurs after every system shutdown 
and start up. 
Limited downward drift in calibration over time Downward drift is in the non-conservative direction and 
if significant enough is a hazard since the sensor will 
report less hydrogen than actual.  Downward drift limits 
the calibration life. 
Fast response time Fast response time is required to detect a hazard 
(hydrogen leaking into the product oxygen) and shut 
down the system.  The current ISS OGA hydrogen 
sensors are required to have a 6 second response time 
(time to indicate 1% when exposed to 4% H2 in O2). 
Long calibration life The current ISS OGA hydrogen sensors are limited to a 
calibration life of 201 days, after which they must be 
returned to the ground for recalibration. 
 
 




Reference 1 provides details on the past work to identify commercially available replacement hydrogen sensor 
candidates, starting in 2017.  Initial bench testing in 2017 identified two viable candidates (Sensor A and Sensor B).  
Next, they underwent 
1,000 hours of endurance 
testing in the OGA Test 
Bed.  This testing 
exposed the sensors to 
flight-like conditions: 
product oxygen from a 
cell stack at the expected 
humidity, temperature 
and flow rate.  Finally, 
the two hydrogen sensor 
candidates underwent 
final bench testing in 
2019.  The bench test rig 
is shown in Figure 10.  
Hydrogen and oxygen are 
introduced into the sensor 
in precise mixtures from 
0 – 3% H2 in O2.  The Mass Flow Controllers (MFCs) meter the amount of hydrogen and oxygen gas. The total flow 
rate is set to either 1.2 lpm, 2.25 lpm or 4.5 lpm, equivalent to ISS OGS setpoints (equating to 3, 5.5 and 11 crew level 
respectively).  The sparger humidifies the bottled gas to bring the dew point from approximately -20 deg F up to dew 
points representative of OGS product oxygen dew points (65, 72.5 and 85 F).  A combustible gas sensor (CG) measures 
the H2 in O2 % of the input and output.  A dew point sensor measures the dew point of the input and output.  A 
pressure sensor monitors inlet pressure.  A solenoid valve introduces nitrogen purge gas into the system in the event 
a failure is detected.  A 3-way valve 
directs gas flow to either the 
hydrogen sensor or to the vent.  A 
second 3-way valve directs either 
inlet gas or outlet gas to the CG 
sensor and dew point sensor.  The 
hydrogen concentration value 
reported by the hydrogen sensor is 
compared to the actual hydrogen 
concentration. 
Sensor A has been selected as 
the preferred sensor for a flight 
demonstration on the ISS OGA in 
2020 based on the final bench test 
results.  A comparison of the initial 
bench test results in 2017 and the 
final bench test results in 2019 at 
the 85 deg F dew point for Sensor 
A are shown in Table 4.  For the 1.2 
and 2.25 lpm flow rates, there is a 0 
to 5% positive drift, for the 4.5 lpm 
flow rate there is a -3 to -5% negative drift.  Sensor A’s response to a 3.5% H2/O2 mixture is shown in Figure 11.  As 
a reference, the legacy hydrogen sensors have a requirement to indicate 1% H2/O2 within 6 seconds of being exposed 




Figure 10. Bench Test Configuration 
 
 
Figure 11. Sensor A’s Response to 3.5% H2/O2 Mixture 
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Table 4. Sensor A Test Results, 85 deg F Dew Point 
A hydrogen sensor flight demonstration unit will be 
installed on the ISS OGA in 2020.  The mechanical, 
electrical and software design is currently ongoing.  
Delivery of the flight unit is planned for June 2020.  The 
flight demonstration unit will be installed at the OGA 
oxygen outlet port and will be mounted externally to the 
OGS rack.  The sensors will remain installed for at least 3 
years. A notional schematic is shown in Figure 12.  The 
unit will contain a four-way valve, three hydrogen sensor 
candidates, a flow meter, and electronics.  The OGA 
product oxygen will flow through the hydrogen sensor 
candidates.  The flow meter will verify that the OGA 
product oxygen is flowing through the hydrogen sensors 
and monitor for leaks.  The four-way valve will allow the 
periodic introduction of calibration gas through the 
sensors.  In this valve state, the OGA product oxygen will 
bypass the hydrogen sensor candidates and flow directly 
into the cabin.  The calibration gas (2% H2/air) will be 
introduced from handheld bottles through the hydrogen sensor candidates every 90 days.  Sensor response to the 
calibration gas will be monitored and trended over time. The electronics will provide 28 V power to the sensors, 
convert the raw sensor readings, and send sensor telemetry to the ground for continuous monitoring and analysis.  
Once the flight experiment is complete, the sensors will be returned to the ground for additional testing to quantify 




D. Delete the Wastewater Interface 
Feed water is batch supplied to the ISS OGA to replace water consumed by electrolysis.  Feed water flows through 
an inlet deionizing bed to remove iodine.  Oxygen in the feedwater can coalesce in the inlet deionizing bed and oxygen 
bubbles will be released periodically out of the bed.  Two gas sensors will detect this release and a three-way valve 
will divert the feed water to the wastewater bus and prevent oxygen gas bubbles from entering the RSA where it could 
mix with hydrogen gas.  Once the feed water is clear of oxygen bubbles, the three-way valve is repositioned to allow 
water flow into the RSA. 
After eleven years of operation, gas bubbles in the feed water have been detected occasionally.  There are eight 
known events (8/21/09, 11/14/09, 4/14/10, 12/19/13, 7/30/14, 8/12/14, 9/4/15, 10/15/15) where the feed water was 
diverted to the wastewater bus due to gas detected in the feed water.  On 12/19/13, oxygen gas was detected in the 
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possible to send this oxygen bubble to the wastewater bus).  After this event, the OGA continued to operate nominally.  
There are no known events since 2015. 
The 2017 supportability analysis study (Reference 1) determined that 216 lb (91 kg) of logistics upmass could be 
saved for a 1,100-day mission by deleting the waste water interface from the design.  The waste water interface is part 
of the Water ORU, as shown in Figure 2.  While the waste water components account for only 22% of the mass of the 
Water ORU, they contribute 66% of the failure rate of that ORU.  As a result, removing the waste water components 
from the Water ORU nearly triples the MTBF of that ORU, lowering the probability of failure and reducing the number 
of spares that would need to be carried.  This provides incentive for deleting the waste water interface.  However, the 
burden for providing gas free water would be placed on the Water Processor Assembly (WPA).  This could potentially 
increase WPA system complexity and logistics upmass.  At this time, the waste water interface will remain in the 
AOGA design, due to the desire to retain the capability to shunt potable water to the wastewater bus to recover from 
off nominal events within the WPA. 
E. Remove the Hydrogen Dome 
The ISS OGA hydrogen dome encloses all hydrogen containing components: cell stack, RSA, solenoid valves, 
relief valves, pressure sensors, temperature sensors, and connecting tubing.  The dome is connected to space vacuum 
and is maintained at a vacuum.  The purpose of the dome is to detect hydrogen leakage out of the cell stack or RSA 
(via a pressure rise in the dome), contain hydrogen leakage and contain any accelerated debris from a possible 
combustion event after multiple failures. 
There are commercial and military cell stacks that have operated safely for thousands of hours without a dome.  
During ground testing, the ISS OGA cell stacks are regularly operated safely without a dome.  The dome was 
incorporated into the ISS OGA design out of an abundance of safety conservatism.  The disadvantage of the dome is 
that the internal components are inaccessible to the crew for maintenance.  If one of the components fails (such as a 
valve), the entire dome assembly (288 lb launch weight) will need to be replaced. In over twelve years of operation 
on ISS and on the ground, no external hydrogen leakage out of the cell stack or RSA has occurred. 
The 2017 supportability study (Reference 1) determined that deleting the dome and allowing component level 
maintenance of the internal components, would result in an estimated 617 lb (280 kg) of spares mass savings for a 
1,100 day exploration mission.  However, removing the dome from the OGA design is not a trivial task.  With a no-
dome design, a specific failure scenario is of concern.  After multiple failures, a leakage of hydrogen into the rack or 
cabin could potentially occur.  The leak could be a small undetectable continuous leak or a large sudden release.  Small 
undetectable leaks will likely not pose a hazard as they will remain below the flammability limit with proper 
ventilation and eventually will be removed by the Trace Contaminant Control System. Large sudden releases of 
hydrogen are considered to be a hazard.  If this were immediately ignited, a nearby crew member could potentially be 
harmed.  In order to quantify the risk, testing and analysis will need to be performed.  Table 5 documents the additional 
testing and analysis which will need to occur. 
 
Table 5.  Additional Tasks Required to Support Dome Removal from the Design 
Task Description Status 
Remove the dome from the OGA 
Test Bed 
Demonstrate safe operation without 
a dome 
Dome removal in the OGA Test Bed 
is complete.  Testing is ongoing. 
Perform hydrogen release analysis Determine the maximum amount of 
hydrogen that could instantaneously 
be released externally by the 
undomed components in the event of 
multiple failures 
Initial analysis is complete.  
However, the analysis will need to 
be updated as the redesign 
progresses. 
Perform flash fire testing and 
analysis 
Determine effect on a nearby crew 
member of a hydrogen release (due 
to multiple failures) and combustion 
Complete 
Perform cell stack burst test Test to demonstrate that an undomed 
cell stack will not leak at the 
Maximum Design Pressure (MDP) 
Complete 
Redesign internal components to 
have redundant seals 
Most internal components currently 
have a single seal preventing 
hydrogen from leaking externally.  
Not started 
 




Redesign will be required for certain 
parts to incorporate redundant seals 
to meet safety requirements 
Perform Maximum Design Pressure 
(MDP) analysis of undomed 
components 
Determine the MDP of undomed 
components (cell stack and RSA) 
Analysis is ongoing and will 
complete in 2019 
Add hydrogen and oxygen flow 
sensors to the design 
Supplement existing leak detection 
methods 
Demonstrated feasibility of flow 
sensors in the OGA testbed.  Testing 
is ongoing. 
Rack ventilation computational 
fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis 
Verify that rack ventilation will 
dilute a hydrogen leak below the 
LFL 
Started in 2019 
 
The vacuum dome was removed from the OGA Test Bed in 2015, and since then has operated safely for over 
1,000 hours.  No external hydrogen leakage has been detected by facility hydrogen sensors.  The cell stack, RSA, and 
all other hydrogen containing components are exposed to the ambient air.  The OGA Test Bed will continue to be 
operated in this configuration for the foreseeable future. 
A hydrogen release analysis was performed in 2018 to determine the worst case amount of hydrogen that could be 
instantaneously released from an undomed OGA in the event of multiple failures during non-operation.  A preliminary 
worst case estimate determined that approximately 92 cu-in of hydrogen could be released from the cell stack in the 
event of multiple failures.  This estimate will likely change as the AOGA design 
matures.  Additional hydrogen release above 92 cu-in will occur if a failure occurs 
during operation.  The amount of hydrogen that can be released during operation 
will depend on the sensitivity and responsiveness of the new hydrogen and oxygen 
flow meters.  As discussed below, ground testing of the new flow meters is 
ongoing, therefore the worst case amount of hydrogen release during operation has 
not yet been determined. 
The hydrogen flash fire testing was completed in 2018.  The results were 
summarized in Reference 1.  The results were presented to the ISS Safety Review 
Panel (SRP) in April 2018.  Combustion of hydrogen releases up to 115 cu-in were 
categorized as low risk of long term hearing effect, and there were no concerns 
identified with overpressure or total radiative exposure.  Therefore, releases below 
115 cu-in will not be considered a catastrophic hazard, but rather a critical hazard.  
Based on these results, the SRP concurred with the AOGA dome-less design 
(contingent on closure of assigned actions).  Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
will be an effective control to the acoustic hazard. 
The cell stack burst test was completed in 2018.  A development cell stack of 
the proposed AOGA 22-cell design was built. All components which would affect 
external leakage were flight like, including the end plates and cell frames.  Internal 
components which would not affect external leakage were substituted for lower 
cost equivalents, including the cathode and anode screens and membrane catalyst.  
The test plan called for hydraulically pressurizing the cell stack until leakage or 
burst occurred.  The test stand had the capability to pressurize the cell stack up to 
3,000 psig.  High speed video cameras were in place to capture any destructive 
burst of the cell stack.  In addition, calipers were in place to measure the growth in 
height of the cell stack as it was pressurized.  During the test, the stack pressure 
was increased in 50 psig increments.  As the cell stack was pressurized, it grew in 
height.  No leakage or deformation was observed until the cell stack was 
pressurized to 1,000 psig.  At this pressure, water droplets were observed on the outer edges of the cell stack hydrogen 
manifold, as shown in Figure 13.  In addition, it was observed that the cell stack grew in height by approximately 
0.018 inch, which allowed some loss of compression between the cell frames, and paths for external leakage to form.  
When the pressure was removed, the cell stack returned to its original height and no permanent deformation was 
observed.  Normal operating pressure of the cell stack is approximately 10 psig.  The expected MDP (worst case 
pressure due to a failure of internal components) of the AOGA cell stack is expected to be under 500 psig.  Although 
 
Figure 13. Water Leakage 








this test is a single data point, it provides confidence that the cell stack does not require redesign.  Future analysis will 
be required to corroborate the test results. 
Existing OGA sensors can provide an indication of external hydrogen leakage from the un-domed cell stack or 
RSA.  Pressure sensors monitor the recirculation loop pressure and dP sensors monitor the quantity of water in the 
RSA.  An external leak can cause a drop in the recirculation loop pressure and RSA water quantity if the leak is large 
enough.  To provide finer leak detection, new sensors are required.  Flow sensors in the hydrogen vent line and the 
oxygen outlet line are proposed for AOGA.   An external leak of hydrogen will cause a decrease in flow of hydrogen 
out of the hydrogen vent line.  A cross cell leak, allowing hydrogen to flow out of the oxygen outlet line, will cause 
an increase in total flow out of the 
oxygen outlet line.  Gas flow can 
be sensed in various ways.  One 
method of detecting flow is to 
sense delta pressure across an 
orifice installed in the line.  A 
valve (acting as an orifice) and a 
delta pressure sensor were 
installed in both the hydrogen vent 
line and oxygen outlet line of the 
OGA testbed.  The modified 
hydrogen vent line is shown in 
Figure 15.  Accurately sensing 
flow at different production rates 
was demonstrated in 2018 and 
described in Reference 1.  In 
2019, the response of the 
hydrogen flow sensor to hydrogen 
leaks was demonstrated in the 
OGA testbed.  External hydrogen 
leaks in the hydrogen vent line 
and two phase water/hydrogen 
leaks in between the cell stack and RSA were purposely introduced to determine the sensitivity and response time of 
the hydrogen flow meter.  If the actual hydrogen flow rate is less than the theoretical hydrogen flow rate, then this 
could indicate an external leak upstream of the flow meter.  However, sensor drift, controller electronics drift, and 
system/sensor noise can affect the smallest size of leak able to be detected.  Also, if a leak occurs at the same time as 
a transient event (such as a production rate change or RSA water fill), then the leak may be masked for a period of 
time.  Hydrogen and two phase leaks were introduced during steady state 
operation and transient events.  The size of the leaks introduced were 15%, 
20%, 50%, 75% and 100% of the hydrogen production rate.  An example of 
hydrogen flow meter response to an external hydrogen leak during steady state 
operation is shown in Figure 14.  Nominally, the dp (as indicated by the blue 
line) is approximately about 0.28 psid at 10 A, corresponding to a production 
rate of approximately 0.23 lb/hr of hydrogen.  When a 20% leak, 0.0047 lb/hr, 
is introduced, (as indicated by the orange line) the dp sensor reading decreases 
by 25%, from 0.28 to 0.21 psid.  Based on these test results a worst case 
hydrogen release can be calculated. 
The MDP of the components previously inside the dome (cell stack, RSA, 
and associated components) needs to be reassessed.  Previously, it was assumed that the dome would contain the 
bursting of the cell stack and RSA in the event of an internal combustion event.  Therefore, the MDPs of the cell stack 
and RSA were set to the maximum pressure due to a non-explosive event, such as valves failing.  Now that the dome 
has been deleted from the AOGA design, it must be confirmed that these components can withstand the worst case 
pressure due to an internal combustion event without bursting.  The MDP of the cell stack and RSA now needs to be 
set to the pressure of a worst case internal combustion event. 
The original MDP of the ISS OGA cell stack in a dome was set to 80 psig due to the valves in the Nitrogen Purge 
ORU failing open.  Without a dome, the new AOGA cell stack MDP must be set to the pressure due to a worst case 
combustion event within it. As a part of the additional safety analyses, worst case credible cross-cell leakage scenarios 
 
Figure 15. Hydrogen DP Sensor Response to a 20% Hydrogen Leak 
 
 








inside the cell stack were evaluated to determine the potential for a combustion event, deflagration, or detonation and 
the resulting overpressure within the cell stack. A worst case scenario was identified where a failure would allow 
hydrogen and water to enter the oxygen header.  This could happen if a seal between the hydrogen-water header and 
the oxygen header fails or a Nafion membrane in one of the cells develops a tear or hole.  The gas phase composition 
would be 45.2% hydrogen, 54.8% oxygen by volume.  The water would be in the liquid phase at a ratio of nine 
volumes water to one volume of gas. Therefore, the leak in this case will result in the oxygen outlet line being filled 
with liquid water at 90 % by volume.  The resulting gas mixture is within the flammable and detonable range.  
However, for a detonation event to occur one of two other conditions must be satisfied.  Either the gas mixture must 
be exposed to an ignition source that is a sufficiently strong shock to directly initiate a detonation or a weak ignition 
source sufficient to promote combustion and sufficient confinement with detonable gas mixture to permit flame 
acceleration (FA) until deflagration to detonation transition (DDT) can occur.  No sufficiently strong ignition source 
could be found that would produce a shock strong enough to directly initiate a detonation for either mixture.  The 
possibility of a weak initiation source sufficient to promote combustion (perhaps a stray catalyst particle) and sufficient 
confinement with a detonable gas mixture to permit flame acceleration (FA) until DDT could not be ruled out.  
However, the presence of 90% liquid water by volume will reduce the possibility of ignition, and should ignition occur 
will cool the flames, absorb energy, and essentially hamper all combustion processes.  Therefore, deflagration or 
detonation occurring within the cell stack is not indicated.  Then, the worst-case scenario for overpressure is what can 
arise from an adiabatic, isochoric (constant volume), complete combustion (AICC).   AICC overpressures can be 
calculated from the well-established NASA Chemical Equilibrium with Applications (CEA) computer program also 
known as Gordon-McBride computer code, which indicates a maximum overpressure of 147 psia (preliminary 
estimate) within the cell stack.  However, there is the distinct possibility of a combustion event in another section of 
the AOGA creating a higher overpressure within the cell stack, and this must still be examined and accounted for. 
The original MDP of the ISS OGA RSA was set to 50 psig, due to a cell stack leakage failure. Without a dome, 
the new AOGA RSA MDP must be set to the pressure due to a worst case internal combustion event. The worst case 
scenario is when an oxygen bubble dislodges from the Inlet DI Bed and is inadvertently allowed to enter the hydrogen 
and water filled RSA due to two valve failures (the water inlet valve failing open and the 3-way valve failing in the 
deliver position).  The system detects the oxygen release into the RSA and shuts down, however cannot prevent it due 
to the valve failures.  The largest size oxygen bubble that could be released from the Inlet DI Bed is estimated to be 
3.3 cu-in. at 25.7 psia based on prior ground test.  It is assumed that the RSA runs long enough before shutdown to 
thoroughly mix the oxygen with the hydrogen.  In the end, there is a water volume of 56 in3, and a gas volume to 9.2 
in3, pressurized to 45.2 psia. The gas is a mixture of 20.5 % oxygen and 79.5 % hydrogen.  This is a flammable and 
possibly detonable mixture.   The center of the RSA contains dry gas. Should a catalyst particle find its way there, it 
could act to ignite a flammable mixture and create a detonation in the central shaft region.  Flame propagation and 
acceleration is impeded in the outer drum region, due to it being largely occupied by water.  This combustion in the 
outer portion of the RSA can be conservatively characterized by an AICC event.   Analysis of the RSA simulator test 
data at WSTF in 2015 shows a two-step combustion: a rapid acceleration and the possibility of a DDT in the central 
region of the RSA, followed by pressurization of the outer RSA region (pressure piling) followed by an AICC 
combustion.  The detonation in the central region will cause the gas to expand approximately 18 times its original 
volume into the gas volume in the drum.  AICC combustion of the now pressurized gases pushes on the surrounding 
water to exert a pressure on the case estimated to be approximately 630.5 psia.  This pressure is well above the 50 psig 
MDP of the RSA motor housing.  Other connected AOGA components such as the cell stack and water pump would 
be subjected to this pressure.  The design team is currently investigating methods for preventing this worst case 
overpressurization event from occurring.  This worst case event requires two valve failures.  One method of preventing 
this worst case event from occurring would be to add a third valve (a redundant water inlet valve) to the design. 
Additional MDP analyses will be performed in 2019.  Other sections requiring analysis include the oxygen outlet 
line, feedwater inlet and recirculation loop. 
In the absence of a dome surrounding the cell stack and RSA, the potential of external hydrogen leakage after a 
failure must be considered.  The design team has just started to analyze this scenario, and will continue work 
throughout the remainder of 2019.  Within the OGS rack there is an existing Avionics Air Assembly (AAA) mounted 
on the center shelf on the left side of the rack.  Its original purpose is to ventilate the rack to prevent a buildup of 
oxygen above 28.5% given a worst case oxygen leak, prevent condensation, provide cooling to Sabatier and to provide 
ventilation for the proper operation of the rack smoke detector.  Air is pulled in from the cabin, the rack, and Sabatier 
into the AAA and returned to the rack with leak paths back to the cabin.  CFD analysis has shown that the current rack 
ventilation design using the AAA will not provide the proper airflow around the cell stack and RSA (located in the 
 




bottom right section of the rack) to prevent the hydrogen concentration from exceeding 4% in the event of a failure 
leading to a hydrogen leak. 
Several design options are being considered to provide proper ventilation around the cell stack and RSA.  The first 
option involves placing the cell stack and RSA within an enclosure.  This enclosure has a dedicated ventilation system 
provided by fans, which draw in cabin air, which is circulated throughout the box and exhausted back out into the 
cabin.  Preliminary CFD analysis has determined that this configuration would provide the proper airflow to prevent 
a combustible mixture from forming in the event of a hydrogen leak.  An additional concern with an enclosure is the 
potential for overpressure and acoustic noise in the event of a combustion resulting from leakage of hydrogen into the 
enclosure (especially when the ventilation system is unpowered).  Two cases will be considered as boundary 
conditions: one is that the hydrogen mixes uniformly throughout the entire box free volume, the other is that the 
hydrogen mixes with a corresponding amount of air to form a stoichiometric mixture.  An ignition source is assumed 
for each case.  Assuming the free volume within the enclosure is 3,000 cu-in and a worst case leakage of 170 cu-in of 
hydrogen, a uniform mixture could form which would be 5.67% by volume. This mixture is above the lower 
flammability limit (LFL) in air and is theoretically combustible. But mixtures less than 8% v/v are barely flammable 
and when ignited do not completely burn.  But, this analysis will assume complete burning as a worst case assumption.  
The lower confined detonability limit in air is usually given as a range of 11% to 18%.  So this mixture will not 
detonate. A 5.67% hydrogen in air mixture combusted at pressure of one atmosphere will result in a pressure of 
approximately 1.2 atmospheres (17.6 psia).  This assumes complete combustion at constant volume. This would be a 
momentary overpressure of approximately 2.9 psia. The second bounding case assumes that the escaped hydrogen 
forms the most sensitive mixture possible with the air inside the enclosure.  This is a uniform, stoichiometric mixture 
containing 29.5% hydrogen by volume.  This will release the maximum combustion energy and the analysis will 
assume that ignition happens at that time.  If confined, this mixture could transition to a detonation.  Further analysis 
will be undertaken to evaluate whether the stoichiometric mixture would result in a detonation due to confinement by 
the components in the enclosure or a deflagration due to the mixture only occupying 19% of the total free volume 
inside the enclosure.  CFD analysis to calculate flow patterns around the components in microgravity will be a part of 
that work.  The acoustic hazard outside of the enclosure from a combustion event inside the enclosure will also be 
considered. 
A second option that will be analyzed involves a new duct which will route a portion of the AAA exhaust to the 
cell stack and RSA.  A third option that will be analyzed involves a new duct from the AAA inlet routed to the cell 
stack and RSA that will draw in cabin air past those hydrogen containing components.  Once all of the CFD analysis 
is completed in 2019, the AOGA ventilation configuration will be finalized. 
F. Redesign the PSM 
ISS OGA PSM is a constant current power supply for the 
cell stack.  It is able to provide over 3800 Watts of power for 
electrolysis.  The PSM is a modular design, containing 4 
power converter units along with filter boards, control board, 
relay, sensors, etc. The internal configuration is shown in 
Figure 16.  The PSM has a weight of 100 lb and dimensions 
of 15 x 24 x 11 inches. 
The PSM will need to be redesigned for several reasons.  
The PSM design was performed approximately 20 years ago.  
A PSM redesign study was conducted in 2016 which 
concluded that the design is based on discrete components 
and some of these are obsolete.  A reduction in mass and 
volume could be realized using a space rated microcontroller.  
This one microcontroller could potentially take the place of 
dozens of discrete components.  At this time, the ISS Program 
is electing not to fund redesign the PSM.  The legacy PSM 
will be used for the ISS AOGA. 
One concern is whether the legacy PSM can provide power to the AOGA cell stack, which will have 22 cells 
instead of 28 cells.  Fewer cells will mean a lower total cell stack voltage.  The PSM minimum specified voltage is 38 
V.  AOGA cell stack could have a beginning of life voltage of 33 V.  There is a concern that the PSM could be unstable 
and electrically inefficient at 33 V.  In January 2019, a single power converter was tested at the lower voltage.  The 
testing indicated no issues at the lower voltage, however lower efficiency was observed.  Based on the successful 
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power converter results, the Engineering Unit PSM was successfully tested at lower voltages in April 2019.  This 
provides confidence that the flight PSM will not require a redesign to power an AOGA cell stack.  Future ground 
testing is recommended with a flight PSM and an AOGA cell stack (when it is available). 
G. Redesign the Recirculation Loop ACTEX 
A -311 ACTEX deionizing bed, with inlet and outlet hoses, was retrofitted into the ISS OGA recirculation loop in 
2011 to prevent recurrence of the cell stack failure in 2010 (Reference 2).  The purpose of the ACTEX is to remove 
fluoride that is released by the cell stack membranes (as part of normal operation) and maintain a desirable pH level 
in the water recirculation loop.  The ACTEX was not specifically designed for the OGA, and should be redesigned 
and optimized for AOGA.  Table 6 describes the requirements for a redesigned ACTEX.  The redesign of the ACTEX 
is expected to begin later in 2019. 
 
 
Table 6. Requirements for a Redesigned ACTEX 
Requirement Current -311 ACTEX Redesigned ACTEX 
Life 1.8 years 3 years 
Pressure drop ~16 psid ~3 psid 
MDP 40 psig 160 psig 
Seal redundancy Single seals Dual seals 
Materials compatibility Incompatible Compatible 
   
The resin within the redesigned ACTEX will not change, however the design of the housing will change to address 
the issues listed in Table 6.  The amount of resin will need to increase to meet a 3 year life.  With the current ACTEX 
design, the water flow rate through the bed is higher than recommended by the resin manufacturer for the bed volume, 
resulting in transitional flow and a relatively high dP.  The volume, diameter and length of the housing will be 
increased to ensure laminar flow.  To further reduce dP, the housing inlet and outlet bore diameter will be increased, 
a pair of quick disconnects (QDs) will be deleted and the mesh filter design will change.  To address safety concerns, 
dual seals will be incorporated and there will be material changes. 
H. Redesign the Process Controller 
Two newly designed sensor boards will need to be installed into the process controller to accommodate the 
additional sensors and effectors in the new AOGA design. In addition, the backplane will need to be redesigned to get 
additional power and signals to the new boards. The thermal analysis will need to be updated to confirm that there is 
adequate cooling with the redesigned controller.  New internal controller harnessing will be required to get power and 
signals from the backplane to the circular connectors that feed through to the external OGA harnessing.  Rack electrical 
harnesses will have to be modified to mate to new electrical components. System software will be modified to control 
new effectors and monitor new sensors. 
IV. Future Plans 
Testing and analysis to inform the AOGA design will continue throughout 2019.  Detailed design will start in 
2019.  Hardware delivery of kits to transform the ISS OGA to an AOGA configuration will be delivered in 2022.  The 
ISS OGA will be upgraded to an AOGA configuration in the 2023 timeframe.  This configuration is expected to 
incorporate a redesigned cell stack, hydrogen sensors, ACTEX, and process controller and delete the hydrogen dome. 
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